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Species as Models
Abstract: This paper argues that biological species should be construed as abstract
models, rather than biological or even tangible entities. Various (phenetic, cladistic,
biological etc.) species concepts are dened as set-theoretic models of formal theories,
and their logical connections are illustrated. In this view organisms relate to a species
not as instantiations, members, or mereological parts, but rather as phenomena to be
represented by the model/species. This sheds new light on the long-standing problems of
species and suggests their connection to broader philosophical topics such as model
selection, scientic representation, and scientic realism.
1 Introduction
Biological species has arguably been one of the most controversial topics in the
philosophy of biology. Philosophers and biologists alike have long debated over \correct"
concepts of species and their ontological status. The traditional account took species as
a category, class, or type instantiated by individual organisms. After the advent of
evolutionary theory, the typological concept came under re by those who identify
species with a part of biological lineage (Ghiselin 1974; Hull 1976). They forcefully
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argued that a species is not an abstract type but a concrete historical entity of which
individual organisms are mereological bits. Although this individualist thesis became a
de-facto standard in the philosophy of biology in the last century, some have complained
its lack of explanatory power and called for a revival of a type or natural-kind based
concept of biological species (Boyd 1999).
To this debate between individualists and typologists, this paper introduces yet
another thesis according to which species taxa are models of scientic theory. Model is a
notoriously equivocal concept, but in this paper it is understood as a set-theoretic entity
that makes sentences of a given theory true or false. This implies that biological species
are mathematical, rather than biological or even tangible, entities. To work out this
claim I begin Section 2 with a reconstruction of various (e.g., phenetic, cladistic,
biological etc.) species concepts in terms of formal models that licence characteristic sets
of inferences. The model-theoretic rendering illustrates logical connections among
dierent species concepts and provides a platform to evaluate them as a problem of
model selection. Section 3 then expounds on philosophical implications of the
model-theoretic interpretation. Identifying species with models entails that the
organism-species relationship is not instantial or mereological, but rather
representational; i.e., species as models represent individual organisms. This opens the
possibility of applying general philosophical discussions on scientic representation and
realism to vexed questions concerning the epistemic and ontological status of biological
species. Through these arguments this paper puts the species problem under broader
contexts of model selection, scientic representation, and scientic realism, depicting it
as a special case of the generic question as to how science investigates the world.
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2 Species as models
This section eshes out the main claim of this paper by reconstructing various species
concepts as set-theoretic models. The central idea is that species concepts specify
theories that underpin biological inferences and descriptions, and species are models that
satisfy such theories.
2.1 Typological species concepts
The traditional typological view denes species by its essence, or necessary and sucient
conditions or traits. This nds a straightforward expression as a biconditional form
8x(Sx$ T1x ^ T2x ^    ). The extension of species S that satises this formula then is
the intersection
T
iTi (see Figure 1(a)).
Though crude as it is, the biconditional formulation allows certain inferences from
traits to species and vice versa. It is this kind of logical reasoning that has enabled, for
example, the famous French zoologist George Cuvier to reconstruct the anatomy of a
whole organism from just a single piece of bone. As is well known, however, such
inferences have very restricted validity, because in most cases it is impossible to nd a
denite set of phenotypic or genetic characteristics that exclusively denes a given
species. Evolution implies species boundaries to be necessarily \fuzzy," which
undermines simple biconditional forms. The typological species concept has thus been
criticized for its lack of expression ability: a simple algebra of trait-sets cannot capture
the nuanced reality of biological species.
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Figure 1: Illustrations of models of various species concepts, with corresponding formal
setups. In each model dots/nodes represent individuals. See text for explanation.
2.2 Cluster species concepts
The cluster species concepts avoid this diculty by dening a species as a group or
cluster of similar organisms that do not necessarily share a common set of traits. The
question then is how to dene similarity. Its earliest variant, the phenetic species
concept, represents organisms in a multi-dimensional space each axis of which denes a
recorded trait (Sokal and Sneath 1963). Phenotypic similarity is then measured by the
euclidean distance between two points/organisms, and a chunk or cluster of organisms in
this euclidean space is identied as a species (Figure 1(b)). The choice of euclidean
distance is not obligatory. One could, for example, measure similarity by the cosine
between two points in the normalized phenotypic space, in which case the similarity
amounts to correlation, with a species being identied as a correlated cluster or more
generally a probability distribution over the phenotypic space (Boyd 1999).
The phenotypic space with a certain metric or probability distribution is certainly a
much richer machinery than overlapping sets and allows for more nuanced expressions
and inferences. The sophisticated theoretical background (euclidean geometry or
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probability theory) enables one to measure the similarity among organisms and to make
a trait-species inference in the absence of necessarily or sucient criteria. To what
extent such clustering and inference reect objective species boundaries, however, was
disputed, for the similarity calculation depends much on which phenotypic characters are
taken into account. It should also be noted that, like the typological concept, the cluster
concepts are purely static and lack a means to express the evolutionary past, the point
often criticized by more historical approaches to species.
2.3 Cladistic species concepts
The cladistic species concepts focus on evolutionary history and dene species solely in
terms of phylogenetic relationships, as a \branch" (monophyletic group) in the
evolutionary tree (Hennig 1966). Since ancestral relationship is antisymmetric and
transitive, phylogeny forms a (strict) partially ordered set or poset (
;), with 

corresponding to a set of organism and  meaning \is an ancestor of." A cladistic
species is then dened as descendants from some founder organism(s) !f :
f! 2 
 : !f  !g: (1)
An obvious advantage of the cladistic concepts is that it is faithful to the fact of
evolution, and for this reason it has been most well received by biologists and
philosophers alike. It is not, however, without aws. For one, although the requirement
of monophyly species a necessarily condition, it is silent as to how big a branch must be
to qualify as a species (for even a small family can satisfy (1)), and so far no satisfactory
sucient condition was given (Velasco 2008). The monophyly requirement has also been
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criticized to be too strong, for it would count birds as reptiles because the smallest
monophylic group including lizards, snakes, and crocodiles also includes birds. That is,
the cladistic species concepts make paraphyletic groups like reptilia meaningless (Sensu
Narens 2007), which strikes some to be too high a price to pay.
2.4 Relational species concepts
Another popular approach is to dene a species as a group of individuals in a certain
relationship to each other. The biological species concept, for instance, denes species as
\groups of interbreeding populations that are reproductively isolated form other such
groups (Mayr 1942)" so that the required relationship here is mutual crossability. Other
variants focus on reproductive competition (Ghiselin 1974) or organisms' capacity to
recognize each other as a possible mate (Paterson 1985). All these proposals try to
reduce species into mutual relationships (interbreeding, competition, recognition, etc.)
between a pair of organisms. If we represent such relationships by an edge between
nodes/organisms, a relational species can be dened as an isolated complete subgraph or
clique in an undirected graph, that is, a group of nodes in which every two distinct nodes
are connected but none is connected to outside (Figure 1(d)). Relational species thus
nd their model in graph theory, where edges represent the relation in question.
A common criticism of relational species concepts is that the focal relationship such
as crossability sometimes fails to induce isolated cliques because some organisms at a
species boundary can often mate with organisms that are thought to belong another
species (e.g. ring species). Moreover, the biological species concept has been criticized to
imply every asexually reproducing organism forms a distinct species (for any singleton
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node is complete). These criticisms suggest that the real biological network is so \messy"
that just a single relationship cannot divide it into distinct cliques in a non-trivial way.
2.5 \Combo" solutions
The model-theoretic rendering makes explicit what each species concept can and cannot
meaningfully say about the biological world. Given that most of the criticisms we have
seen concern the \cannot say" part, one way to deal with these diculties is to combine
dierent theories to obtain more complex denitions of species.
For instance, one may combine the cluster and cladistic species concepts and dene a
species as a lineage that shares the same or similar phenotypic distribution:
f! 2 
 : !f  ! ^ (!f ) = (!)g (2)
where  : 
! Rn assigns distribution parameters to each organism ! 2 
.1 On this
denition one may meaningfully dene paraphyletic species and distinguish birds from
other reptiles on the basis of the dierence in their phenotypic or genetic proles. It can
also account for anagenesis (speciation without branching) and continuity of species
between a cladogenesis (splitting event).
If one replaces  in (2) with a dierent function  : 
! N that maps organisms
! 2 
 to their niche (!) 2 N , it becomes the ecological species concept which denes a
species as \a lineage ... which occupies an adaptive zone minimally dierent from that of
1For non-parametric cases, we can set  : 
 ! R1 and modify the denition as
f! 2 
 : !f  ! ^D((!f ); (!)) < kg where D() is a divergence measure (such as the
Kullback-Leibler divergence) and k is a constant.
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any other lineage in its range (Van Valen 1976, 233)."
Yet another combination is that of the cladistic and biological species concepts,
which would dene a species as a maximum monophylic lineage that can mutually
interbreed, so that
f!x; !y 2 
 : !f  !x ^ !f  !y ^ !x  !yg (3)
where  stands for crossability.2 This will make up for the lack of a sucient condition
in the cladistic species concept, and accord well with the so-called evolutionary species
concept which emphasizes the unique \evolutionary tendencies and historical fate" of
each species (Wiley 1978, 17). It should be noted that this could also avoid the problem
of ring species because two crossable organisms may not necessary share the same
ancestor.
2.6 The scientic species problem as a problem of theory choice
The above discussion shows that (i) major species concepts can be dened as models of
formal theories, and that (ii) more complex concepts can be obtained by combining basic
ones. The model-theoretic approach characterizes each species concept with the formal
apparatus it assumes, which in turn determines its expressive power or what can
meaningfully be stated about organisms and/or their history (Narens 2007). In general,
a richer theoretical apparatus allows for more nuanced expressions, which makes it less
liable to counterexamples. This is illustrated in the progression from the typological to
2As in the case of the biological species concept, the crossability here must take into
account the existence of two sexes.
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cluster and then to cluster-cladistic concepts, where in each step the species concept
acquires the ability to deal with fuzzy boundaries and evolutionary history, respectively.
It does not necessarily follow, however, that a richer concept is always desirable,
because it tends to have a greater degree of freedom and requires more data in actual
application. While only phylogenetic information suces to demarcate cladistic species,
the cluster-cladistic concept also requires phenotypic or ecological information, which in
many cases may not be available. A stronger semantic power thus comes with a higher
epistemic cost, as is often emphasized by pheneticists or cladists in their respective
advocacy of the phenotypic cluster and cladistic species concepts.
This suggests that the competition among various species concepts should be
understood as a problem of model selection, where dierent models are evaluated on the
basis of their explanatory or descriptive power versus parsimony or operationality (Sober
2008). Indeed, most disputes among advocates of dierent species concepts arise from
their dierential emphasis on what aspects of the biological world a disable species
concept needs and needs not take into account (Ereshefsky 2001), but the diculty is
that these emphases are often implicit and incommensurable. Although the
model-theoretic approach does not arbitrate these debates, it provides a common formal
framework that makes explicit the explanatory power and operationality of species
concepts and facilitates evaluation of their respective advantage.
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3 Philosophical implications
3.1 Species are models
Upon the model-theoretic reconstruction of various species concepts, we now turn to the
philosophical thesis that species taxa should be construed as models proposed above, i.e.,
as set-theoretic entities. To proceed, let me rst begin with an analogy from classical
mechanics. Classical mechanics is a theory about Newtonian particles, which are
customary dened as volumeless points or vectors in a three-dimensional Euclidean
space. Newton's celebrated laws like F = ma describe temporal evolution of a system
composed of such \particles." This system is to be distinguished from any actual
physical systems, say the solar system, for one thing, no concrete bodies are volumeless,
nor do they indenitely continue rectilinear motion as prescribed by Newton's rst law.
Newton's theory, or any other physical theories for that matter, is a description of
idealized and abstracted models and not of actual phenomena (Cartwright 1983). That
is, models of classical mechanics | which make its laws and statements true | are not
concrete, physical entities, but rather abstract mathematical objects that can be
constructed within set theory (McKinsey et al. 1953).
The role of models in science has been emphasized by the so-called semantic or
model-based view of scientic theories (e.g. van Fraassen 1980; Suppe 1989).3 In the
traditional, logical-positivist view, a scientic theory was supposed to directly describe
3This label (\the semantic view") has been used to describe dierent, and logically
independent, theses. In particular, while some philosophers (e.g. Suppes 2002) take a
scientic theory as a description of models, others identify it with a set of models (van
Fraassen 1980). In this paper I adopt the former thesis without committing to the latter.
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observed data. This has set for positivists the dicult task of reducing theoretical
concepts that seemingly lack direct empirical contents to observation vocabulary by way
of bridge laws or partial interpretations. To avoid this diculty, proponents of the
model-based view take a model, rather than observation, as the primary descriptive
target of a scientic theory. In this view, a theory species an abstract model that
idealizes and extracts just salient factors, and only indirectly relates to actual
phenomena via such an model.
I submit that the species problem is a variant of the positivist conundrum. Species is
a highly theoretical concept, and various proposal of \species concepts" in the past can
be understood as attempts to build bridge laws for reducing it to a set of observational
or operational criteria. To date more than a dozen of dierent concepts have been
proposed4, with no general consensus | each has its own strength, but also weakness
and exceptions when applied to the rich and heterogeneous biological world. The
assumption has been that a species concept must be a faithful description of actual
biological features or phenomena. But what if this assumption is untenable, or at least
unreasonable? The model-based view has been quite popular among philosophers of
biology (e.g. Beatty 1981; Lloyd 1988). If we adopt this view and construe evolutionary
theory as describing models, then species too must be dened accordingly, i.e., as (a part
of) abstract models that satisfy descriptions and/or inferences of the corresponding
theory.
What, then, are theories about species? Without claiming to be exhaustive, this
paper adopts Suppes's (2002) thesis that a scientic theory must be dened as a
set-theoretical predicate. The foremost advantage of this approach is that it enables one
4Mayden (1997), for example, counts at least 22 concepts of species.
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to easily harness a theory with mathematical apparatus necessary for sophisticated
reasoning. As discussed above, contemporary studies on species rely heavily on
quantitative methods to calculate similarity or reconstruct a phylogenetic tree from
phenotypic or genetic data. Given that such mathematical reasoning requires matching
formal models of calculus or probability theory, the straightforward way to dene a
species is to build it upon these mathematical backgrounds as an extension of these
formal models. Section 2 is a preliminary sketch of applying this Suppesian program to
various species concepts. If this attempt turns out to be successful, biological species are
to be understood as parts of set-theoretic structures, just like Newtonian particles. That
is, they are mathematical and abstract constructs, rather than physical or biological
entities.5
The purpose of the set-theoretic exposition is not just to accommodate quantitative
reasoning. Even with less quantitative cases like the biological species concept, it makes
implicit assumptions explicit and suggests a way to deal with counterexamples. The
problem of ring species, for example, arises from a conict between the presumption that
each biological species must be isolated and the fact that crossability is not necessarily
transitive and thus fails to induce equivalence classes. One possible response to this
charge then would be to weaken the former assumption and redene a species just as a
(not necessarily isolated) clique in the reproductive network. Clarication of theoretical
assumptions helps us to assess other species concepts as well. For example, the phenetic
species concept is often claimed to be \theory-free" in that it does not depend on any
evolutionary hypothesis. But as we have seen in Sec. 2.2, the calculation of phenotypic
5Hence the present thesis should not be confused with the view that species are sets or
collections of organisms (Kitcher 1984), which, after all, are concrete biological entities.
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similarity presupposes a phenotypic space equipped with a particular (e.g., euclidean)
metric, which is a fairly strong theoretical assumption. Also, cladists often stress the
simplicity and purity of their monophylic species denition that only considers
phylogenetic relationships. But in order to make use of likelihood methods to infer such
relationships, as is common in practice, a simple poset is not enough: one also needs to
assume some genetic or phenotypic distribution, and then there is no in-principle reason
to exclude non-monophylic taxa from the denition of species (as (2) in Sec. 2.5).
The nal but not least merit of the set-theoretic approach is its exibility: it allows
for a construction of a new species concept by combining existing ones (Sec. 2.5) or
adding new theoretical assumptions. For instance, it is common in experimental biology
to characterize a species by shared developmental or causal mechanisms: developmental
biologists often talk about \the development of the chicken" and medical doctors rely on
causal extrapolation when they prescribe a clinically-tested drug for their patient. Such
a \causal species" may be dened by isomorphic causal models, which combine a
probabilistic distribution and a causal graph over variables. Hence the discussion in
Section 2 covers just a few samples that can be constructed within this general
framework. This does not of course mean that every possible species concept can and
must be formalized, but does suggest the potential of the set-theoretic approach to
accommodate the use of existing species concepts and to develop novel ones.
3.2 Philosophical implications
Identifying species with theoretical models sheds new light on some vexed philosophical
issues, one amongst which concerns how individual organisms are related to species taxa.
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Philosophers have long debated whether the organism-species relationship is instantial
(organisms are particular instances of a species qua class), membership (they are
members of a species qua set; Kitcher 1984), or mereological (they are parts of a species
qua genealogical entity; Ghiselin 1997). The model-theoretic approach suggests an
alternative account, according to which a species represents (a group of) individual
organisms. Just as the Rutherford-Bohr model represents the microscopic structure of
atoms, models proposed in Section 2 represent biological populations: for example, nodes
and edges consisting of the biological species model in Figure 1(d) respectively represent
organisms and crossability. Representation captures our intuitive notion that a model
and its target phenomenon share salient static or dynamic features up to a certain
precision. Given that said, it must be admitted that the criteria and nature of scientic
representation are diversied and still open questions (Frigg and Nguyen 2016). Hence
calling the species-organism relationship representational does not necessarily demystify
it, but at least implies that the problem is not endemic to evolutionary theory: it is
rather a version of a broader philosophical issue as to how the use of scientic models
help us understanding the world. This means that the arsenal of this rich philosophical
literature can and should be consulted to elucidate the nature of the species-organism
relationship. Another, more immediate implication is that the membership and
mereological accounts must be both abandoned, for whatever the relationship between a
model and phenomena turns out to be, the latter must certainly not be a member or
part of the former.
Neither is representation identity or instantiation. Ideal gas is not identical to any
actual gas, but only approximates thermodynamic characteristics of some. Hence strictly
speaking it has no instantiation, but this does not detract its epistemic validity. Likewise
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species concepts, as specications of ideal models, need not directly apply to actual
populations. No wild population big enough to qualify as a species would strictly satisfy
the requirement of the biological species concept, because actual mating chance is often
hindered by physiological, geographical, and other contingencies. In the same vein, a
phenetic or genetic cluster is expected to have outliers when applied to a real population.
However, the presence of such exceptions should not immediately invalidate the
corresponding species concepts, because the value of a species concept consists less in its
universal validity than its epistemic serviceability for inferences and explanations of
evolutionary or biological phenomena. These two criteria often conict: Cartwright
(1983) even argues that explanatory theories necessarily distort the reality by idealizing
the situation and extracting only relevant features, so that properly speaking they are
\lies" by design. Cartwright's examples are physics and economics, but her idea also
applies to the present context. The primary function of a species concept is to explain
biological phenomena rather than to save them, so that a few discrepancies should not
be taken as a falsication.
The conict between exceptionlessness versus explanatory power also underlies the
realism-nominalism debate over species. The proponents of the nominalistic thesis who
claim a species to be nothing but a totality of individual organisms have motivated their
view by criticizing the realist interpretation of species-as-class for its commitment to the
typological thinking and failure to deal with the evident heterogeneity of biological
phenomena (e.g. Ghiselin 1997). On the other hand, those who attach weight on the role
of species concept in induction and explanation have upheld a realist position and
treated species as natural kinds (Boyd 1999). The present thesis oers a third
alternative, recognizing the explanatory role of species concept without committing to
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the ontologically heavy assumption of natural kinds. As we have seen in Section 2,
species as models licence particular sets of inferences. The cluster and typological
species/models underpin an expectation that physiological or genetic features found in,
say, laboratory animals would also be shared by other individuals of the same species,
while the evolutionary species concept explains the reason of such intra-specic
similarities. These explanations are eectuated by the same model representing
numerically distinct individuals or phenomena to be explained. Note that this procedure
no more presupposes the existence of the model as an independent, real entity, than do
explanations based on, say, ideal gas. Indeed, explanations may be based on ctional
models, as is the case with the Ising model in statistical mechanics.
This does not of course mean that models must be ctions, or that species do not
exist. Recent advocates of scientic realism argue that successful scientic models
capture some, especially structural, aspect of reality (Ladyman 2016). Given its anity
to the model-based view of scientic theories, species realists may well apply this line of
reasoning to the present context, taking the set-theoretic structures as discussed in
Section 2 as representing the reality or \essential feature" of biological species. Whether
and to what extent such an argument carry over, however, remain to be examined by a
further study.
4 Conclusion
The past debates over biological species have been based on the assumption that species
concepts must describe actual biological phenomena, the strict adherence to which tends
to rule out all but cladistic species as typological or inexact. The present paper
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challenged this assumption and argued that the primary referent of a species concept is a
(set-theoretic) model that licences a certain set of inferences specied by the concept.
The model-theoretic rendering articulates explanatory power and theoretical
assumptions of each species concept and illuminates logical relationships among them.
Once species are specied as models, the long-standing competition among dierent
species concepts reduces to a common problem of model selection. This suggests that
evaluation of relative merits and demerits of species concepts must be based more on
their explanatory power than on exceptionlessness.
On the philosophical side, the shift in the ontological status of species means that the
organism-species relationship is not that of instantiation, membership, or mereology, but
rather representation. The vexed issue that has troubled philosophers for decades,
therefore, boils down to the broader problem as to how and why scientic models can be
used to represent and explain the world. This suggests the possibility to apply the rich
literature on scientic representation and realism to elucidate the epistemological and
ontological nature of biological species.
In sum, the take home message of the present paper is that the species problem is not
endemic to biology or evolutionary theory, but rather is a variant of general scientic
and philosophical issues of model selection, scientic representation, and realism. The
purpose of this paper was just to establish such a parallelism: determining its
philosophical implications on specic debates such as realism or pluralism concerning
biological species will be a task for future studies.
17
References
Beatty, John. 1981. \What's Wrong with the Received View of Evolutionary Theory?."
PSA 1980 2: 397{426.
Boyd, Richard N. 1999. \Homeostasis, species, and higher taxa." In Species: New
Interdisciplinary Essays. ed. Robert A Wilson, 141{158, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Cartwright, Nancy. 1983. How the Laws of Physics Lie. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Ereshefsky, Marc. 2001. The Poverty of the Linnaean Hierarchy. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
van Fraassen, Bas C. 1980. The Scientic Image. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Frigg, Roman, and James Nguyen. 2016. \Scientic Representation." In The Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy. ed. Edward N Zalta, Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford
University.
Ghiselin, Michael T. 1974. \A Radical Solution to the Species Problem." Society of
Systematic Biologists 23: 536{544.
1997. Metaphysics and the Origin of Species. Albany, NY: State University of
New York Press.
Hennig, Willi. 1966. Phylogenetic Systematics. Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press.
Hull, David L. 1976. \Are species really individuals?" Systematic Zoology 25: 174{191.
Kitcher, Philip. 1984. \Species." Philosophy of Science 51: 308{333.
18
Ladyman, James. 2016. \Structural Realism." In The Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy. ed. Edward N Zalta, Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University.
Lloyd, Elisabeth A. 1988. The Structure and Conrmation of Evolutionary Theory.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Mayden, R L. 1997. \A hierarchy of species concepts: the denouement in the saga of the
species problem." In Species The Units of Biodiversity. ed. M F Claridge, H A Dawah,
and M R Wilson, 381{424, London: Chapman & Hall.
Mayr, Ernst. 1942. Systematics and origin of species. New York, NY: Columbia
University Press.
McKinsey, John C C, Patrick Suppes, and A C Sugar. 1953. \Axiomatic Foundations of
Classical Particle Mechanics." Journal of Rational Mechanics and Analysis 2: 253{272.
Narens, Louis. 2007. Introduction to the Theories of Measurement and Meaningfulness
and the Use of Symmetry in Science. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Paterson, Hugh E H. 1985. \The Recognition Concept of Species." In Species and
Speciation. ed. E. S. Vrba, 21{29, Pretoria.
Sober, Elliott. 2008. Evidence and Evolution. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Sokal, Robert R, and Peter H A Sneath. 1963. Principles of Numerical Taxonomy. San
Francisco, CA: W. H. Freeman and Co.
Suppe, Frederick. 1989. The Semantic Conception of Theories and Scientic Realism.:
University of Illinois Press.
19
Suppes, Patrick. 2002. Representation and Invariance of Scientic Structures. Stanford,
CA: CSLI Publication.
Van Valen, Leigh. 1976. \Ecological Species, Multispecies, and Oaks." Taxon 25:
233{239.
Velasco, Joel D. 2008. \The internodal species concept: a response to `The tree, the
network, and the species'." Biological Journal of Linnean Society 93: 865{869.
Wiley, Edward O. 1978. \The Evolutionary Species Concept Reconsidered." Systematic
Biology 27: 17{26.
20
